Technical Disclosure Commons
Defensive Publications Series

February 04, 2019

VIRTUALIZED INTELLIGENT HONEYPOT
AGENT
Plamen Nedeltchev
Mani Kesavan
Hugo Latapie
Enzo Fenoglio

Follow this and additional works at: https://www.tdcommons.org/dpubs_series
Recommended Citation
Nedeltchev, Plamen; Kesavan, Mani; Latapie, Hugo; and Fenoglio, Enzo, "VIRTUALIZED INTELLIGENT HONEYPOT AGENT",
Technical Disclosure Commons, (February 04, 2019)
https://www.tdcommons.org/dpubs_series/1928

This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 License.
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Technical Disclosure Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Defensive Publications
Series by an authorized administrator of Technical Disclosure Commons.

Nedeltchev et al.: VIRTUALIZED INTELLIGENT HONEYPOT AGENT

VIRTUALIZED INTELLIGENT HONEYPOT AGENT
AUTHORS:
Plamen Nedeltchev
Mani Kesavan
Hugo Latapie
Enzo Fenoglio
ABSTRACT
A honeypot system is described that can expand to any attack surface as it learns
and grows with the changing device landscape. The system also takes into account the
human elements that originated the attack. By using adversarial training mechanisms, the
system may be quickly trained to become a doppelganger and attract attacks. Moreover, a
unique quantum cognitive framework provides a robust adaptivity to ever-changing
attacker strategies. Virtualized intelligent honeypot agents may be introduced into the
network, device, or server, to connect and share knowledge to facilitate federated learning
for similar type of agents. The agents may also be operated in multitasking for many similar
types of devices, users, applications, and the like.
DETAILED DESCRIPTION
Honeypot is a well-known security mechanism for luring attackers, as well as
studying and countering attack attempts [6]. However, with the advent of the Internet of
Things (IoT) and wearable devices, and the ever-changing technology landscape, the attack
surface is expanding. It is becoming increasingly difficult to adjust and create convincing
handcrafted honeypots. IoT devices are not scanned by legacy cyber defense systems indepth, and remain prime targets for attackers within the network. Also, honeypots that are
set up at a demilitarized zone or periphery of the network do not cover vulnerabilities that
occur inside the network through wearables and other devices that enter the network.
Recent issues with ransomware highlight the fact that the attack surface is expanding with
devices that can enter and exit a network. It would be useful to have an intelligent system
that can adapt to this expanding attack surface, cater to different areas of that surface, and
make proper counterattack decisions even under a given level of uncertainty.
Cyber attackers are improving at detecting conventional honeypots. Combining the
ability to open attachments, interact with websites and other online services, and interact
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with IoT devices, provides a rich contextual environment which makes client honeypot
detection that much more difficult.
A smart attacker knows that a simple or direct attack is unlikely to be effective.
Hence, s/he may try to deceive the system by mixing up actions in a rather sophisticated
plot through machine learning techniques and opportunistic decisions. For example, s/he
can act stealthily by waiting for an opportunity (passive attacker) or can launch an attack
immediately (active attacker), as described in [1] and illustrated in Figure 1 below.
Moreover, the defender faces an unknown attacker with unknown intentions where
decisions can be made dynamically on observable events that may be non-separable
(entangled) and non-commutative, since they may depend on the order in which they are
presented.

Figure 1 - Attacker and defender in the network

Accordingly, provided is a mechanism to identify potential attackers laterally
entering the network using IoT and wearables. The system injects intelligent doppelganger
agents running in a virtualized sandbox for any IoT device, application, or user that would
normally be allowed into a network. This may include wearable devices, mobiles,
computers, user accounts, etc.
In one embodiment, the system locates a subject device or user and provides an
associated agent. For a new device like a user laptop, an agent associates and acts as a
honeypot agent for that user account. While many Mobile Device Management (MDM)
and Information Technology (IT) systems already inject support agents, this system
supports agents dedicated for the honeypot attack surface. The same agent then acts as an
inciting agent in an adversarial reinforcement learning system, where the agent is trained
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to operate in the presence of a destabilizing adversary that applies disturbance forces to the
system [5]. The purpose of this function is to imitate and fake device functionality while
appearing more attractive for being probed, attacked, or compromised than production
systems that have value. This agent constantly learns how to better mimic a user’s
interaction with the system. The agent may employ generative adversarial networking
principles of deep learning to imitate and adapt to any device, user, or application. The
agent changes its personality dynamically, rather than based on a fixed set of known
vulnerabilities (e.g., manually coded for the fixed set of known vulnerabilities) as is
typically performed on existing morphing honeypots systems.
In a second embodiment, for more sophisticated attackers with unknown intentions
and limited information, the classical Bayesian theory or expected utility maximization
could be applied, despite leading to overlooking and oversimplify the essence of the attack.
Actually, within the classical rational model of decision-making, it is assumed that decision
makers (honeypot agents) comprehensively define a problem, understand all possible
alternatives and their consequences, and select the very best action after evaluating all
available options. On the contrary, the present system considers some paradoxical aspects
of real systems in which (human) attackers operate, which are characterized by limited
cognitive resources, uncertainties, and complexity [2]. In particular, environments may be
characterized by indeterminacy effects (e.g., the state of the system does not determine a
unique collection of values for all its measurable properties), complementary effects,
interference effects (e.g., probing a honeypot virtual agent changes its state), violation of
total probability effects (e.g., prior probability distributions may be zero while posterior
distributions exist), order effects (e.g., probing two agents may lead to different measures
depending on the order), entanglement effects (e.g., agent states for the same IoT device
class may not be separable), and the like. To model an attacker ingenuity, the system may
use heuristics and intuition. However, it is very difficult to find the heurist that works in
every case, especially when a (human) attacker is involved. In this case, a quantum
probability framework is preferable for building a corresponding quantum cognitive model
for decision-making that resolves the irreconcilability between observed features and
classical ideal models.
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This formalism is already used in social science and behavioral economics as a
probabilistic tool [2]. The use of quantum techniques requires that neither the brain nor
consciousness would have anything to do with genuinely quantum systems. The techniques
of quantum theory are used in this context solely as a convenient and efficient mathematical
tool and language to capture the complicated properties associated with the decisionmaking process [4]. Actually, the honeypot virtual agents use quantum probability as a
framework to model uncertainty for a compound entangled system where agents and
environment are inseparable, and to model how agents reflect upon their strategies for
adapting to changing environments where defender decisions are made dynamically on
observable events.
The present system targets IoT devices in the network by associating each device
with a virtual attractive (i.e., easily attacked) smart agent to form a meta-network that
continuously locates and quarantines new threats by exchanging information and
improving future counterattack strategies through deep adversarial learning and a
reasoning engine. The system may build knowledge from learned strategies observed on
attackers shared among all agents by making small changes to data samples. This model is
predictive. Prediction is based on the generative adversarial networking principle of deep
learning to generate adversarial behavior that imitates a device and learns new counterstrategies. For more sophisticated protection, agents may not maximize their utility, but
instead adapt their behavior to the incomplete information acquired from other agents and
the environment within the limited resources they have. Non-Bayesian quantum
probability together with a reasoning engine may be used to describe this process of
adaptivity [3].
Three examples are provided as follows. First, if an Active Directory (AD)
management system comes online, an agent associated with that system may begin faking
group or user creation vulnerabilities. Second, for a personal device, the agent may select
links and attachments, fill in forms with its (fake) “personal information,” and otherwise
mimic a human who is completely unaware of good security practices. Third, for any
device, an agent may add time warp and execution environment analytics (e.g., change in
code signatures, memory, processes, startup code, sensitive storage areas, etc.). This
addresses dormant ransomware and other hacks, as the sandbox agent may intelligently
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proceed in time in a manner that would be difficult to determine because the ransomware
could try to detect such time warps.
Since attackers are always searching for different vulnerabilities, they can be lured
into such an agent pretending to be a device. Since the agent is constantly learning and
updating its behavior, the attacker may be fooled into believing that the hard-coded fake
honeypot device is a transaction system. The quantum cognitive model provides an
augmented framework to estimate probabilities for correct decision-making strategies and
human probabilistic inferences.
A general decision-making formalism is provided which includes machine (e.g.,
honeypot agents) and human (e.g., cyber attacker) elements. Artificial quantum
intelligence may enhance the quality of the decision-making capabilities under
environmental uncertainty and incomplete information. This demands adaptive behavior
by virtual agents to respond to the changes in complex dynamic environments.
Every attempt to understand the environment is an interaction ( i.e., a measure) that
in turn affects the environment. The interaction of a cyber attacker between the
environment and the other virtual agents is a generative process to acquire knowledge. The
generative process takes place as a continuous interaction with the environment. Due to the
uniqueness of every virtual agent, each generative process is unique, but decisional
conflicts may emerge. Current approaches based on classical Bayesian theory oversimplify
the nature of the decisional conflicts, and as a result, solutions are also oversimplified or,
more likely, prone to being wrong or ineffective (i.e., need to be constantly adapted by
proper heuristics) to defeat attackers.
As opposed to classical Bayesian approaches [1], quantum cognition [2],[3],[4]
provides axiomatically coherent answers to decisional conflicts among virtual agents under
incomplete information and uncertainties.
Failure to recognize that defender/attacker interactions occurred in an uncertain
environment may lead to serious consequences, including: (1) lack of interoperability; (2)
information vulnerabilities, which can impede the operation environment because of the
dependencies on the decision aid tools; and (3) impeding of adaptive behavior due to
inadequately available heuristics.
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A non-Bayesian cyber-attack game (quantum cognitive model) of incomplete
information reflects the defender (virtual agent)’s imperfect knowledge of incoming
attacks (e.g., malicious or not). This one-shot game model addresses the basic questions as
to how the defender should dynamically predict new scenarios/observations for the cyber
attacker, and whether deception is optimal for both the attacker and defender without using
knowledge-based techniques. This may be performed with the generative adversarial
model.
These techniques use generative adversarial learning and imitating devices, users
on production network to newer device personalities, and newer user account baits for
offering up both Personally Identifiable Information (PII) and network system
vulnerabilities.
In summary, a honeypot system is provided that can expand to any attack surface
as it learns and grows with the changing device landscape. The system also takes into
account the human elements that originated the attack. By using adversarial training
mechanisms, the system may quickly train to become a doppelganger that can attract
attacks. Moreover, a unique quantum cognitive framework provides a robust adaptivity to
ever-changing attacker strategies that adequately model human causal reasoning.
Virtualized intelligent honeypot agents may be introduced into the network, device, or
server, to connect and share knowledge to facilitate federated learning for similar type of
agents. The agents may also be operated in multitasking for many similar types of devices,
users, applications, etc.
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